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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper summarizes the author’s considerations on the measurement of a national economy’s 
historical aggregate product.  Given the sources from which we can start, and the objective we wish 
to reach, the proper path follows logically; the extant corpus of historical national accounts seems to 
follow a very different path, uninformed by due reflection. 
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RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST: 
 THE MEASUREMENT OF AGGREGATE PRODUCT 
 
 
 
Peccata nominabo, peccatores rare. 
 
 
1.  ECONOMICS, ECONOMIC HISTORY, AND THE “DATA” 
 
 
1.1  The scientization of economics 
 This paper presents a discours de la méthode; and it begins perforce with an 
intellectual history. 
 The discipline we call economics was born in Europe.  By the early twentieth century 
economics was felt to comprise three essential strands, indissolubly linked:  economic theory, 
economic history, and the history of economic thought.  These were the core disciplines in the 
university training of economists, as it was then structured; a Luigi Einaudi, an Eli Heckscher, 
a Joseph Schumpeter moved seamlessly across all three. 
 Economics, so structured, so taught, was clearly not considered a “science”:  a medical 
doctor, for example, is considered fully trained even with no exposure to the history of 
medicine (Hippocratic humors) or to the history of medical problems (the Great Plague).  
Economics studied not the natural world but human behavior and institutions; it was clearly 
seen as more subtle, more complex, more political, à tout prendre, than a science.  To use the 
language of our own day, economics was seen as a non-linear, multi-layered discourse that 
could not be understood by hearing only its most recent lines.  To master economics, the logic 
ran, one has to understand how and why it has come to contain what it does, understand the 
problems that engaged past economists, the economic problems of their day, what to us is 
economic history; and to understand economic history, by the same token, one has to master 
economics. 
 The first half of the twentieth century was marked by a number of related changes.  
First and most broadly, the two World Wars Europe inflicted upon itself stripped it of its 
former hegemony, which passed to the United States, in cultural matters as in others.  
American graduate programs in economics used to mimic European models; now the reverse 
is true. 
 The Americanization of economics was not without consequence, for America has its 
quirks.  Culture is not there highly regarded, it seems to be considered more a feminine 
adornment than stuff for real men.1  America instead worships science, only America could 
spawn a Church of Scientology.  In Europe the élite schools educated, the bright kids did 
classics, the scientific program was for second-raters; in America schools train, the scientific 
program carries the highest prestige.   
 We all value prestige; American economics, quā American, morphed into a “social 
science” (a poor oxymoron to anyone with any nous, but now, like the dollar, international 
                                                 
1
 When my then Department chairman at Duke University described his family’s European visit he 
noted that they had abandoned the slow-moving guided tours, and boasted “We had done four 
cathedrals before breakfast!”   
 
2 
 
currency).  The triad that composed economics was quickly dissolved:  economic history and 
the history of economic thought were demoted from the core curriculum to fringe 
specializations, the histories of economic thought recast, impoverished, as the development of 
context-free abstract reasoning.2  The discipline attributed to itself the cumulative nature of 
the (true) sciences:  leading economists have been heard to brag that they have their students 
read nothing over three years old, in the early 1960s I myself heard Paul Samuelson declare 
that “any graduate student today is a better economist than Keynes.”  Economics became 
culture-less, and lost its sense of what it is.3 
 Between the wars, too, the developed world suffered the Great Depression:  a 
challenge to the orthodox economic theory of the day, which could not begin to explain it.  
The well-known outcome was of course the Keynesian revolution, the commitment to 
maintain full employment (even in peacetime), the development of “national accounts” (and 
their continuous updating by the appropriate public Bureau) to diagnose the path of the 
economy and inform anticyclical intervention; on all this more below.  A possible side effect 
was that the employment problem captured the attention of the profession, which with bigger 
fish to fry set economic history aside; and the void was filled by historians with no grasp of 
economics at all, even the best of whom penned interpretations that stood on end the hair of 
any economist who was not irretrievably ba(l)d.  Whatever the reason, between the wars 
economic history became ever more history, ever less economics; the throwaway distinction 
between “economic historians” and “competent economists” by Lionel Robbins (1939, p. 9) 
was harsh but not unjustified. 
 That of course set the stage for the reconquista, the recovery of economic history by 
competent economists, the recovery specifically of the principle that economic historians 
must use the tools provided by up-to-date economic theory (Einaudi 1936a, p. 158).  As we 
know, it happened first in the United States (and struggled to cross the Atlantic, overcoming 
only with difficulty the entrenched opposition of Departments of economic history, non-
existent or virtually so in North America).  It need not have – European economists could well 
have revived their own earlier tradition – but it did; and the “new” economic history that 
emerged owed and owes much to postwar American economics. 
 With a proto-Trumpian sense of subtlety, culture, and decorum the “new” economic 
history trumpeted its innovative “scientific” method, the construction of models and explicit 
counterfacts, the testing of hypotheses against the data.  It provoked initial opposition, much 
                                                 
2
 To my mind one cannot understand the theory of international trade if one does not understand 
Ricardo.  Ricardo is now portrayed as “the first abstract economist”; I see him as a thinker fully 
engaged in the political struggles and economic controversies of his day, and his Principles as a tract 
against the Corn Laws and the landed aristocracy that imposed them.  His “model of trade” attacks 
tariffs in general with a carpet of dumb bombs; the smart bomb precision-guided to his target was his 
“model of growth” (a stealth characterization, to push the metaphor); see Fenoaltea 2011a, pp. 152–
165, 252–257, 265–272. 
 
3
 A telling episode is the discipline’s reaction to the “prisoner’s dilemma,” greeted as a novel 
challenge to our faith in the “invisible hand.”  As far as I could tell from the early literature nobody 
pointed out that economists alone were ignorant of the issue, and of the solution (norms, ethical or 
legal, in the specific case at hand the “honor code” of omertà, and the certainty that if you confess to 
anything at all your family will be exterminated).  The lesson of the “prisoner’s dilemma” was 
common knowledge, and considered generally valid, from time immemorial; economics traces its tap-
root to the physiocratic intuition that in certain (“economic”) walks of life self-interested behavior 
need not be collectively maleficent (at least under certain conditions that have since been explored, 
e.g., free and informed consent, sufficient competition, ethical restraint on the abuse of asymmetric 
information, und so weiter), and that regulation is then unnecessary if not harmful. 
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of it directed at Robert Fogel’s startling (and clearly wrong) claim that the railroads’ 
contribution to America’s economic growth was “not important”; but it was ineffective 
opposition, the obtuse complaint that counterfactuals were unhistorical (as if any statement 
that a affected b does not rely on one, at least implicitly), that economists’ models were “too 
simple” (as if simplicity were not in itself a virtue that commands assent, and excessive 
simplicity were not to be determined case-by-case, depending on the model’s use and 
purpose).4  Brash enthusiasm met incompetence, a swift triumph was foregone. 
 I was in the United States, working on a doctorate in economics, when the “new” 
economic history burst upon the scene; I was present at the creation, I was born, as it were, a 
“new” economic historian.  With my European background (and the cultural snobbery of the 
classically educated) I would as lief be called a hog farmer as a scientist; nor do I set 
particular store by quantification, let alone the econometric “testing” of hypotheses, called for 
in some cases but not in others.5  The “new” economic history soon earned the sobriquet 
“cliometrics,” but that was merely a joke that stuck, a name accepted perhaps because it 
played on the prestige of Econometrica, but not meant to capture the essence of the discipline.  
That essence, to my mind, is the return to economic history of competence in economics, and 
that alone.  I do not believe much, but I do believe that without such competence one cannot 
hope to understand the economic past – just as one cannot hope to understand the past history 
of disease, say, if one is not versed in epidemiology, no more, no less.  I see economic theory 
as the mistress of the cliometric household, quantification and econometrics as mere servants, 
to be summoned as needed.6 
 
                                                 
4
 The human mind, every last one of us, is convinced by the simplest possible explanation:  think of 
the fellow who discards the complex set of hypotheses that supposedly explain his wife’s repeated 
tardiness in returning home from work in favor of the single, powerful hypothesis that she is seeing 
somebody else.  The complaint of unrealistic oversimplification was made ad personas, nobody 
extended it to the astronomers who model our entire world as a mere point with mass.  Fogel played 
on the confusion of importance with necessity rather than sufficiency, arguing that Brutus (Cassius) 
was “not important” to Caesar’s death because Cassius (Brutus) would have killed him anyway.  He 
pretended to calculate the railways’ marginal product, the extra output (“social saving”) they allowed, 
as an economist would; but when we measure a factor’s marginal product we do not contemplate 
substitution, if we did the marginal product of (homogeneous) labor would be identically zero (see 
Fenoaltea 2011a, pp. 168–169, and references therein).  The early confusion between the differential 
and scarcity components of the rent of land comes to mind. 
 
5
 Testing hypotheses is like skinning cats, the econometric way is not the only one.  The hypothesis 
that gravity bends light was verified by taking advantage of a solar eclipse to observe a star (angularly 
near the sun) where we knew it wasn’t:  the theory correctly predicted that what we observed was not 
a fact at all.  My own model of slave management correctly predicted that the observations in the 
secondary sources which contradicted it misrepresented the facts (Fenoaltea 1984, footnote 40). 
 
6
 This was the shared view of the cliometric pioneers:  at the 1985 meetings of the (American) 
Economic History Association, by then dominated by its cliometric Young Turks, the going prizes 
were swept by a paper that contained no algebra, no tables, and no econometrics, but for all that fully 
satisfied its cliometric judges because it developed an analysis only an economist could have authored.  
But we armed our children with econometric packages and let them loose upon the world, rather like 
Africa’s boy soldiers; we may have done no more than ferry economic history from serious historians 
who were inadequate economists to serious econometricians who are inadequate historians and, in 
much of the work they do, sociologists/political scientists/whatever as embarrassingly amateurish as 
the “old” economic historians were economists.  In a way, in fact, the discipline has come full circle:  
where ours was proudly problem-driven, that of our young is as source-driven as the historians’ “old” 
economic history used to be. 
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1.2  Economics, measurement, and “data” 
 For all that, of course, the application of economics to real-world problems remains a 
naturally quantitative exercise, never more so than in the present context, the reconstruction of 
past economic growth.  A hundred years ago, the aspiration of the profession to empirical 
relevance led to the creation, at Harvard, of The Review of Economic Statistics.  That title 
contained a research program:  we economists were asking ourselves what measures we 
wished to have, and how to construct them.  Within thirty years that search was abandoned, 
that flag hauled down, that journal blandly renamed (“The Review of Economics and 
Statistics”):  in the wake of the Keynesian revolution national and supranational bureaucracies 
took on the task of documenting the economy, and the profession sat back, happy enough to 
receive its data from an external source.  At that very time (American) economics was 
redefining itself as a science; most sciences jealously reserve unto themselves the generation 
of their empirical evidence, but two do not.  One is economics, the other, astrology. 
 The upshot was that “scientific” economics developed a schizoid attitude towards the 
empirical evidence.  Much attention was paid to the quality of data-processing, to the 
exploration of the relationships among the numbers:  econometric technique became ever 
more sophisticated, improving by leaps and bounds.  Vanishing attention was instead paid to 
the quality of the data themselves.  Data were simply taken as data, given (typically by public 
Bureaus), to be retrieved and uploaded (or, increasingly and even more simply, downloaded); 
“measurement” was viewed as no more than data retrieval, an activity perhaps time-
consuming but quintessentially unskilled, suitably assigned to graduate students or farmed out 
to research assistants.  We skilled economists would respect data analysis enough to do it 
ourselves, mere “data,” “measurement” we would hold in contempt. 
 It is tempting here to return to an earlier mode of thought, to attribute personality to 
data and measurement, to say they resented that contempt; and that they exacted their 
revenge.  At one point economists analyzed macroeconomic time series for the American 
economy going back into the nineteenth century, and found that the economy was far less 
stable then than it had since become.  Numerous articles on “the stabilization of the American 
economy” quickly appeared in the leading journals; but that strand of the literature came to a 
sudden end.  Christina Romer (1986), in the American Economic Review, informed the 
profession at large of what was, among the pioneering cliometricians, common knowledge:  
that the estimates for the more distant past were not comparable to the data for more recent 
times, that they could perhaps illuminate the longer-term movements of the American 
economy but certainly not its short-term variability.  As Romer pointed out that early 
variability was much overstated, the economy’s much-discussed “stabilization” never 
happened at all:  it was “a figment of the data,” data no one had bothered to validate before 
putting them to use. 
 I do not of course read astronomy journals, but somehow I cannot imagine a scholarly 
discussion of a newly discovered galaxy being terminated by a piece in the Annual Review of 
Astronomy and Astrophysics essentially saying, “uh, guys, hold up:  we checked the original 
photograph, and what looked like an undiscovered galaxy was actually a reflection of the light 
on the newspaper boy’s bicycle.”  In fact, nobody seems to read the journals of alien 
disciplines, and the economics profession washed its dirty linen in reasonable privacy; and 
that may sufficiently explain why economists were not laughed out of academia then and 
there. 
 But what is less easy to understand is the discipline’s own reaction to what should 
have been a sharp lesson:  a total lack of reaction.  The discipline was entirely unfazed, it did 
not plunge into introspection (as anthropology did, with a different but equally damning 
trigger, as succinctly recalled in Fenoaltea 2019a); the general attitude was “another day, 
another dollar, steady as she goes, nothing to see here, move along.”  Nothing happened; 
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some twenty years on Richard Easterlin (2004) would note, and eloquently lament, the low 
esteem in which economists (continue to) hold measurement, the reconstruction of the facts. 
 Economics – American, Americanized “scientific” economics – retains unchanged its 
cavalier attitude towards the evidence; and “scientific” economic history, la cliométrie sa 
fille, inherited that attitude in its genes.  For all their emphasis on quantification, 
cliometricians’ historical measurement is in the main unskilled work, poor work simply 
because it is not informed by due reflection on method; and that brings us back to 
methodology, to the very logic of our reconstructions of past aggregate product. 
 
1.3  On method:  the economic historian’s craft 
 The historian’s craft may overreach, this historian’s craft may be the most I can 
attempt to describe.  In courts of law, I gather, witnesses’ credentials are examined before 
their testimony is taken; so let me introduce my professional persona. 
 Economists, American and Americanized, are in the mass still wedded to naïve 
nineteenth-century positivism:  cut off from the cultural mainstream, a lost tribe in the 
intellectual jungle (Fenoaltea 2019a).  I am in contrast a deep skeptic, unsure of the ultimate 
reality of my own person (Descartes be damned), let alone that of “the real world.”7  But even 
apart from that I am thoroughly convinced that what we call “facts,” (supposedly) observable 
bits of reality, do not exist at all:  even granting an external reality, what we can observe is not 
a fact.  We both saw a chicken cross the road, did it not do so, is that not a fact?  I would 
answer no, our eyes capture only patterns of light and color:  we “see” “a chicken” “cross” “a 
road,” every word in quotes is not an observed object or action but a construct, an 
interpretation of what our eyes actually perceive.  What we call facts are no more than 
agreed-upon, shared interpretations:  perhaps “real” enough for practical purposes, but only 
within a shared set of expectations, culture-bound expectations.  “Facts,” and a fortiori 
evidence of facts, are very slippery stuff.8 
 Past facts are a will o’ the wisp, I cannot write history wie es eigentlich gewesen.  All I 
can do is tell a story, whether in numbers or in words matters little; what matters is that I want 
to tell a good story.  In Italian, as in French and German, the distinction between history and 
literature is merely that between la storia (the story, history) and una storia (a story, 
literature).  Literature does not care to be “true” (and allows limited suspensions of disbelief, 
as with talking animals in fables or satire), history would like to be “true” but cannot be; 
neither is vera, but both can be, and to be any good must be, believable, verisimilar.  My 
(hi)story will be good if it rings true (at least to those with a mind-set similar to mine), no 
more can be asked of it; the historian’s craft is worlds away from the scientist’s, “scientific 
history” is an oxymoron that proclaims, again, a lack of education, a lack of (contemporary) 
culture. 
                                                 
7
 I do know that the possibly imaginary world I perceive is characterized by consistency, by 
predictability (the bedside book that was there when I fell asleep was again there when I woke up, les 
autres that appear to me maintain their characteristics from appearance to appearance); and so I 
behave as if my world were real enough for practical purposes, as if there were such a thing as the 
world.  If observed, I presumably appear, so to speak, perfectly normal:  my skepticism would seem to 
be a private matter, a hidden hairshirt. 
 
8
 That someone who doesn’t believe in facts should turn to writing history may seem odd, but in my 
case the explanation is simple enough.  I see myself first and foremost as a writer, but one denied the 
wit and skills to create literature, unable to invent a world out of whole cloth; forced by my own 
limitations to work on a story line that I am somehow given, I take my story line from the past. 
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 For a (hi)story to “ring true” it must not clash with our strong beliefs; and I have two.  
I believe in the power of human logic, in our capacity for error-free deduction (Descartes be 
blessed); and I believe in the human aversion to pointless toil, to “the sweat of our brows.”  
The one allows us to develop the ineluctable implications of the other:  the discipline that 
does so, that investigates what we call “rational choice” (as if it could be anything else) is 
what we call “economics.”9  And that is why I see the recovery of competence in economic 
theory as the defining feature of the “cliometric” approach, why I see myself as a 
cliometrician, whether or not the problem I am addressing requires quantification; why I find 
no value in the “economic histories” that make no economic sense, the stories that are simply 
not possible if we believe, as I do, in the validity of human logic, and in the human aversion 
to pointless toil. 
 To ring true as economic history, in short, my story must be good economics.  To ring 
true as economic history, quite analogously, it must be good history, it must sit well with “the 
facts.”  As noted, however, our cliometric vulgata glorifies “interpretation,” the elucidation of 
the relationships among the facts, and reduces the elucidation of the facts themselves to 
“measurement,” seen as the simple process of setting a yardstick next to an observed object, 
seen as only a simple-minded nineteenth-century positivist (or contemporary economist) 
could see it. 
 Whether or not we can “observe” the present, we certainly cannot observe the past, for 
it is gone; all we can observe are the traces it left behind.10  The quantitative traces (“data”) of 
particular interest to us are themselves not (“scientific”) observations, but constructs – 
typically byproducts of other, and usually fiscal, public concerns – that must be deconstructed 
if their relation to the “facts” that interest us is to be understood at all.  We cannot observe 
past objects, our sources reveal only their shadows, to reconstruct a shape from its shadows 
we must pinpoint the sources of light; to understand the data in the sources we must 
understand how, by whom, and to what purpose they were produced, we must learn to read 
our quantitative sources, or rather to read through them.  This is the historian’s stock-in-trade, 
but not even a glimmer in today’s economists’ mind’s eye.  That our quantitative sources 
present numbers clearly labeled in our native language, numbers that positively invite us to 
take them at face value, is a trap, a trap for beginners, a trap for naïfs:  a trap a trained 
economic historian should readily recognize and avoid, a trap that should never have become 
a trap for our entire profession.11 
                                                 
9
 It follows that economics is relevant wherever choices have to be made, if only because the day is 
not infinitely long:  those tiresome critics who consider our discipline relevant only to modern market 
economies utterly misapprehend it. 
 
10
 I am reminded here of a book I had, that taught the reader to recognize the presence of unseen 
wildlife from their droppings.  The title that sticks in my mind sounds like Birds of North America, but 
I know it wasn’t that. 
 
11
 Thus for example the long literature that takes Italy’s industrial employment in 1911 directly from 
the “employment” data in that year’s industrial census, never cottoning to what that census actually 
contains; see Fenoaltea (2015a, 2016) and references therein.  The root problem is of course the 
profession’s belief that “data” are merely to be collected, the lack of any sense that proper 
“measurement” requires that the sources be approached with suitable training, the sort of training 
doctoral programs in history provide as a matter of course.  To the best of my knowledge the only 
graduate students in economics ever exposed to a formal course in “reconstructing the past” were 
those that took my course by that name at the Collegio Carlo Alberto in 2014. 
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 What we call “measurement” is in fact a work of interpretation, no less than what we 
call “interpretation”; we quantitative historians cannot measure the past, we must interpret the 
sources to reconstruct it.  And this interpretation is far more difficult than the subsequent 
“analysis,” for three sufficient reasons.  One is that it is not directly constrained, and thus 
facilitated, by codified (economic) theory and (econometric) technique; it is correspondingly 
the work not of fungible “scientists” but of non-fungible artisans, no two of whom will obtain 
the very same results from the very same materials.12    Another is that the sources are opaque, 
that we learn to understand them only little by little (poco a poco, Einaudi 1936b, p. 7):  that 
their hidden defects surface, rather like those of our former spouses, only with extended 
cohabitation.  The third is so to speak that the evidence itself is often not evident.  When it is 
indirect, as it so often is, it takes a good, experienced eye to identify it at all, to grasp its 
potential significance:  it takes a Holmes to see clues where Watson sees nothing, an Indian 
scout to see tracks where the cowboy sees only dust.  
 We cannot observe the past, we cannot reconstruct it as it really was; we can only 
reconstruct it as to our eyes, in the light of everything we know, it most probably was, “it 
must have been.”  The obvious parallel is Viollet-le-Duc’s “restoration” of Vézeley or Notre-
Dame:  a sobering parallel, sobering because such reconstruction clearly requires a taxing 
panoply of skills and breadth of knowledge, sobering too because it remains all the same 
highly personal, and can readily appear distorted by its author’s fantasy.   
The bottom line is that economists and cliometricians are right to believe that 
“interpretation” and “measurement” require different levels of skill and experience, but 
entirely wrong in their mapping.  Our graduate students, our research assistants, well trained 
in economics and econometrics, are as well-equipped as we their elders for “analysis” and 
“interpretation”; it is in the creation of the “data,” the reconstruction of the past, that they are 
challenged, challenged by a lack of training in historical scholarship, challenged even if so 
trained by a lack of familiarity with the sources, challenged above all by their lack of 
experience.13  Only a contemporary economist, highly trained but badly undereducated, can 
be so borné as to entrust to a graduate student the restoration of a Medieval cathedral, the 
reconstruction of the past. 
 I have devoted much of my work on post-Unification Italy to “measurement,” to my 
reconstruction of “the facts” (recounted in the framework of the national accounts, about 
which more below), as God gave me the light to see those facts.14  Such reconstruction is not 
                                                 
12
 Because the derivation of production series is so personal, too, the constructed “data” can be 
verified, replicated, and improved only if their derivation from source to final estimate is exhaustively 
documented.  I was taught by Gerschenkron (1962 [1955]) that such documentation was required to 
meet the minimal standards of serious scholarship; but his lesson was not widely heeded, and most 
historical reconstructions are accompanied by no more than general descriptions of the underlying 
sources and algorithms.   
 
13
 Experience is necessary but of course not sufficient:  some distinguished colleagues appear to have 
discovered the fountain of youth, and make beginners’ mistakes decade after decade. 
 
14
 It is, obviously, my story, my reconstruction, derived in Bayesian terms from the surviving data and 
my priors (Fenoaltea 2015b–h, 2019c); the measures I obtain put my posterior on the line.  My 
“interpretation” story, my story of how the (apparent) facts (apparently) relate to each other, I have 
told elsewhere – repeatedly, and very differently, as the evidence accumulated and my understanding 
evolved (Fenoaltea 1969, 1988/2011a, 2017a). 
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a science but a craft, an arte:  an arte with its regole, its rules of good practice.15   The ur-rule 
is of course to tell as verisimilar a story as one can, a story verisimilar in its description of 
human behavior, and verisimilar too in its interpretation of the surviving sources, sources that 
are never complete and not infrequently inconsistent:  in practice we maximize our story’s 
overall plausibility only in an algebraic sense, we struggle in fact to minimize its overall 
implausibility.  But the operative word is overall, for our implicit loss function is “quadratic,” 
larger deviations from the norm carry more-than-proportional weight:  a story the reader 
repeatedly glosses “maybe…” may receive serious consideration all the same, a single 
“never!” or “impossible!” will see it rejected out of hand. 
 The ur-rule can be developed into a set of less abstract recommendations.  The next 
section offers a pentalogue that distils the fruit of my hard-won experience, an initial 
codification of the art of reconstructing economic growth; the examples are taken from my 
own work, my case study, but their import is general. 
 
 
 
2.  RECONSTRUCTING ECONOMIC GROWTH:  LE REGOLE DELL’ARTE 
 
 
2.1  Rule 1:  Vet the data! 
The first rule, already noted, is that the data in our sources cannot be taken at face 
value.  We must see through them, gauge their relationship to the facts they ostensibly 
document, verify their credibility and potential usefulness; we must vet them, to use a trendier 
term deconstruct them.   
 In principle we should establish how each number in our sources was actually 
obtained, we should systematically investigate the underlying “data generating process.”  We 
who work on post-Unification Italy have the benefit of work done by Istat, then the Istituto 
centrale di statistica, for Italy’s centenary:  the lastingly useful multi-volume Rilevazioni 
statistiche, that documents the production of our “historical statistics,” complete with 
reproductions of the forms circulated to gather the raw data.  But even that is not enough, to 
understand what our data really are we would need to recover the instructions given to the 
enumerators, instructions possibly surviving in some archive, possibly never written down at 
all.16  
 Some of that we can certainly do:  if production statistics were generated by a 
production tax, for example, we can and should go back to the enabling legislation, and learn 
what exactly was being taxed.  Even the mere recognition that the production data are taxed-
based can be instructive, and suggest for example that a sharp decline following a tax increase 
                                                 
15
 A regola d’arte is a common enough Italian phrase, without a direct equivalent in colloquial 
English:  it harks back to medieval crafts (the arti), that guaranteed quality by imposing strict rules 
(the regole) on the materials and the manufacturing process.  A literal translation is “[made] according 
to the rules of the trade.” 
 
16
 As is well known, Italy’s 1881 census counted impossible numbers of female textile workers in the 
South.  Tariffs on textiles had recently been hiked, and the textile factories were notoriously 
concentrated in the North; one wonders whether the census enumerators were “encouraged” to 
document that the industry was nation-wide, thus rescuing the tariff from the charge that it benefited 
the North alone.  But even if this actually happened one hardly expects to find documentary 
confirmation.  
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registers a decline in taxed production only, less a decline in production than a shift to 
bootlegging.  But a systematic approach to documenting the data-generation process is ultra 
vires, and, to the extent that it merely verifies the absence of evidence that it changed from 
one period to the next, not particularly efficient; most of the research we can and should do on 
the data-generating process is not a priori but a posteriori, triggered by signs that it changed 
provided by the data themselves.  The identification of such signs is again a judgment call, a 
matter of interpretation; my guiding principle is Marshall’s natura non facit saltum, it is the 
discontinuities in the series that attract my eye, that signal to me a change in the data-
generating process.17  
 The eye should in fact look deep into the data.  These may be found, already as well-
arranged long time series, in abstracts of historical statistics (for Italy, the Sommario), 
abstracts which have typically lifted them from the statistical annuals of the day (the 
Annuario), annuals which in turn transcribe the more interesting figures from a cited battery 
of primary, narrowly focused sources.  At times, a look at the final series is enough to warn us 
that it is not homogeneous over time; in the Italian context two examples come readily to 
mind.  One concerns the official human-grain-consumption series, which displays an increase 
around the turn of the century that is simply not credible; it turns out to result from the 
interpolation of earlier (grossly underestimated) grain-production figures, disbelieved even 
when they were published, and later (far higher) figures based on much-improved production 
statistics (Fenoaltea 1969, pp. 97–98, 2010, pp. 83–85).  The other concerns the official State-
expenditure-on-public-works series, which looks perfectly normal save for an inexplicable 
downside outlier in 1870; research into the public budget’s accounting rules revealed a change 
at that time, the practical result of which was that the figure for 1870 was only a partial one 
(Fenoaltea 1986, pp. 7–8). 
 But the reconstructed series in the secondary sources typically mask far more than 
they reveal, and nothing catches the eye until one goes back to the primary sources 
themselves.  These typically tell us far more about the data they report than the subsequent 
annuals and abstracts, and most of all they generally allow a literal deconstruction of their 
aggregates, the identification and reconstruction of their components; and even a beginner can 
then spot that the series’ coverage may change over time, that some components appear or 
disappear.  Such reconstructions can also signal an altogether subtler trap, when many 
components do not change at all from year to year:  it means that the elementary data were not 
systematically updated, that the current issue of the primary source simply published the latest 
available figures as the best estimates of the current ones, altogether missing what may be 
significant growth (thus in the Italian case the “annual” quarry and non-metallic-mineral-
product output data for 1901ff. in the Rivista mineraria:  Fenoaltea 2015b, 2015c).  This is in 
fact a trap that will catch all those who construct a cross-section for a given year by consulting 
only the sources for that particular year:  the broader lesson is that cross-sections need to be 
validated by time-series evidence that places year-specific data in their intertemporal context. 
 The final point, qui devrait aller sans dire, is that the historical data are also to be 
vetted in the light of their broader context, what we know, or should know, of the relevant 
activities, institutions, and technology, of somehow related data in other historical sources:  
                                                 
17
 This is admittedly a one-sided test, I will not notice simultaneous discontinuities in the data-
generating process, and in the underlying matter the data refer to, that nicely offset each other; the 
lame response is that such coincidences are presumably rare, and that in any case even a one-sided test 
is an improvement over the prevailing absence of any test at all.  
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the knowledge, the specific culture, that accumulates with experience.18  The inexpert can fail 
badly, assuming for example that all State expenditure for public works was funded by the 
Ministero dei lavori pubblici, confusing for example natural silk and artificial silk, measures 
of volume with measures of weight (Fenoaltea 1986, pp. 6–7, 29; 2003, p. 1099; 2018, p. 
302); my own early howler was the confusion of the engineering industry with the 
“machinery” industry, a confusion prompted by everything, the very little, I had read at the 
time (Fenoaltea 1967, 2017a). 
 
2.2  Rule 2:  Disaggregate! 
 Disaggregate, disaggregate, that is Moses and the prophets! 
 To a historian the impulse to disaggregate should be a natural one, a direct 
consequence of our curiosity about the past.  An aggregate alone is like the low-resolution 
newspaper photographs of now long ago, which if magnified dissolved into a meaningless 
blur; the internet has made us used to photographs that when magnified reveal increasing 
detail, photographs that allow me to zoom in from my hemisphere to my continent, to my 
country, to my province, to my house, to add an Italian touch to my laundry drying in the sun.  
An aggregate (“chemicals”) that allows us to zoom in on its immediate components 
(“electrochemicals”) and then on theirs (“calcium cyanamide”), and even on the local sources 
of these, is thoroughly satisfying – a rare satisfaction, achieved only where the surviving 
documentation is unusually rich.  But the impulse remains, we want disaggregated “data” 
because details are our friandises. 
 But the curiosity that drives us is by no means idle.  In general, the path of an 
aggregate places only very loose constraints on the possible “interpretation” of its movements, 
as is well illustrated by the extant literature on post-Unification Italy; the likely validity of 
such interpretations can be gauged only by drawing out their specific implications, and 
verifying their likelihood in the light of more detailed “data.”  More specifically, when we 
limit ourselves to an aggregate we implicitly and naturally assume that its composition 
remained more or less unchanged; disaggregation can reveal the falsehood of that assumption, 
it can demolish the shared beliefs that underpin an entire literature (as that on the industrial 
investment cycle in post-Unification Italy, Fenoaltea 2017a). 
 Technically, of course, as far as aggregate-level “measurement” alone is concerned the 
purpose of disaggregation is reaggregation, the calculation of an improved aggregate that 
takes changes in composition into account; and to that purpose both vertical disaggregation 
(across “stages of production” within a production sequence) and horizontal disaggregation 
(across production sequences) are to be pursued.  Disaggregation rarely reaches an objective 
limit:  the practical limit comes from vita brevis, we disaggregate far less than we 
theoretically should but as much as we practically can.  Even our elementary disaggregated 
series typically remain aggregates, aggregates we can only hope remain reasonably 
homogeneous over time; the point is simply that that hope is the less forlorn, the more 
extensively we actually disaggregate. 
 The point of vertical disaggregation is of course to distinguish the different time paths 
of successive stages of production; and these differ most readily in the presence of 
international trade in the partially processed goods that are the output of one stage of 
production and the input into the next.  In practice, then, our vertical disaggregation will be 
                                                 
18
 Only acquired familiarity with the institutional framework will reveal what is perhaps the most 
subtle trap, the at times changing definition of the self-same unit of measurement:  merchant ships in 
particular were measured “uniformly” in register tons, but the formula used to calculate tonnage from 
the ship’s specific dimensions was repeatedly changed.  
 
11 
 
dictated by the major trade flows (for example of yarn, to distinguish the path of cloth 
production from that of yarn production), while we ignore or collapse the minor ones (making 
no attempt to distinguish, say, gray, bleached, and dyed yarn).  The myriad steps that compose 
a full production sequence are thus, in practice, reduced to a few:  e pluribus unum, or not 
much more than that. 
 But vertical disaggregation has a further aspect that bears notice.  In general, we can 
calculate the quantity of product A from the “apparent consumption” (production plus net 
imports, ignoring undocumented inventory change) of its input B, and the corresponding 
input-output ratio (B/A); applied through the production sequence, this algorithm generates a 
set of series (one for each successive stage of production) that are locked together by the data 
on the intervening trade flows.19  From this two things follow:  most obviously, that any one 
“known” series can be used, with the trade data, to generate the rest of the set (as is not 
infrequently done, using e.g. net imports of raw cotton to estimate yarn production, and those 
figures plus net imports of yarn to estimate cloth production).  In a data-poor environment, 
none of the series may be “known,” all we know (from the trade data) is how they differ from 
each other.  To fix any one is to fix all the others, to attribute a plausible path to one may 
imply an implausible path for another; in such cases the full set must be fixed with an eye to 
the joint (im)plausibility of the resulting estimates, for the implicit maximand is, as noted, the 
verisimilitude of the entire story we tell.20 
 Technically, horizontal disaggregation improves the aggregate exactly as vertical 
disaggregation does, in this case by distinguishing among goods, and processes, that differ in 
their value added per measured unit of product – typically because of qualitative differences, 
as for example between woollens and worsteds, or between battleships and submarines, at 
times because of economies of scale.21  Heuristically, it involves very different considerations.  
A systematic approach to disaggregating an aggregate forces one to identify its components:  
a novice may consider Italian shipbuilding adequately documented by the “ships launched” 
series in the Sommario, but if we ask ourselves at all what “shipbuilding” covers we will soon 
discover that it includes the production of new ships, merchant and naval, and the 
                                                 
19
 The algorithm obviously extends to (apparent) final consumption, which is simply the production of 
the finished good plus the net imports thereof. 
 
20
 Imagine, to clarify the point, the flax-linen production sequence, undocumented at any stage.  A 
burst of flax imports can be interpreted as fueling a burst of linen consumption, with flat flax 
production – or as offsetting a flax harvest failure, with flat consumption.  As noted, joint 
verisimilitude reflects a quadratic loss function:  a number of mildly unlikely events, together, are less 
unlikely than a single highly unlikely event.  
 
21
 As a rule, there is no substitute for horizontal disaggregation; but at times it can be finessed by 
suitably choosing the unit of measurement.  The archetype here is the wartime measure of aircraft 
production in the United States:  rather than counting aircraft and distinguishing, say, trainers, fighters, 
and medium and heavy bombers, a meaningful aggregate figure was obtained directly by counting 
airframe tons.  In the Italian case, similarly, sufficiently detailed trade data allowed the conversion of 
the aggregate cotton yarn and cloth production figures from units of weight, which fail to reflect 
quality differences, to units of length (of yarn produced, of yarn woven into cloth), which directly 
capture them, obviating the need to disaggregate by quality (Fenoaltea 2019c).  Again similarly, the 
water-supply industry includes the product of aqueducts, characterized by significant economies of 
scale; a synthetic measure could be obtained by measuring the aqueducts’ yield not in tons (per unit 
period) but in equivalent tons, calculated as the actual tons to a power that captures the economies of 
scale (Fenoaltea 2015g). 
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maintenance of existing ships, again merchant and naval.  The extant series’ unit of 
measurement (register tons) is then enough to reveal that it refers to merchant ships alone 
(naval vessels were measured in displacement tons); and “ships launched” clearly refers to 
new ships alone, revealing that the series in the sources documents only one out of the 
industry’s four basic activities (Fenoaltea 2015f).  Horizontal disaggregation thus serves in 
the first instance the same purpose as explicit models and counterfacts, it brings out, and 
invites reflection on, assumptions that otherwise remain implicit and unexamined.   
 The present example was not selected without cause, for the maintenance of durable 
goods raises specific issues of its own.  In the first place, it must clearly be distinguished from 
new production:  the latter tracks the gross additions to a stock, maintenance varies in the first 
instance with the stock itself.  Unlike new production, too, maintenance cannot be 
meaningfully measured by a physical output, because the attendant value added varies, for 
any given type of equipment, with the condition it happened to be in when brought in to the 
shop; in general, the best elementary “real” series one can construct is a measure in “constant” 
monetary terms (typically obtained as a benchmark value added estimate, extrapolated by an 
index of the maintained stock’s activity, at worst of the stock itself).  Third, and in the 
circumstances unsurprisingly, maintenance is even more sparsely documented than new 
production:  ships, trains, and public infrastructure aside, typically, there is damn little to go 
on.  The upshot is that the disaggregation to separate maintenance from new production is at 
once necessary, and difficult:  in the (again typical) Italian case the censuses did not separate 
maintenance shops and workers from new-production shops and workers – which were often 
the very same ones, as blacksmiths, for instance, engaged indifferently in the one as in the 
other – and the two activities can only be disentangled with the aid of ancillary evidence.22 
 The separation of maintenance from new production entails in fact two further 
problems, of a different order.  The minor problem is whether to attribute value added in 
maintenance to industry or to the services; the choice affects only the distribution of an 
unchanged aggregate, and the issue is no more than an irritant (attributable to the United 
Nations, as the ISIC is here thoroughly inconsistent).  The more significant problem is 
whether to consider maintenance production of (reconditioned) durables, and thus capital 
formation that inflates GDP, or a cost of producing the goods and services that employ those 
durables, an intermediate product that finally cancels out of GDP (as do all non-durables 
consumed in further production); and on this there is no consensus, nor uniformity in the 
literature.  These issues are here only noted, to be returned to below (Appendix A). 
 
2.3  Rule 3:  Think when you index! 
 “Indexation” is a catch-all term for filling gaps in “the data,” for coping with time 
series that lack pieces or do not exist at all; it is so called because we use a “known” series as 
an “index” of (a proxy for the movements of) an unknown series.  The above discussion of 
vertical disaggregation recalls a common form of indexation, the use of raw material 
                                                 
22
 Evidence that may be far removed, and not obvious a priori.  To clarify the point with an example, 
estimates of Italy’s blacksmiths’ aggregate value added in 1911 can be derived from that year’s census 
data.  Per unit of value added, new production consumes far more metal than maintenance; given total 
metal consumption, and the value added/metal consumption ratio in new production revealed by 
market prices, the disaggregation of value added into new production and maintenance yields an 
implicit value added/metal consumption ratio in maintenance which must itself be reasonable next to 
the corresponding ratio in new production.  The estimates for 1911 are much more tightly constrained 
by the relative ratios they imply for 1871, when total metal consumption per worker was much lower, 
than by the relative ratios they imply for 1911 itself (Fenoaltea 2015f). 
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consumption movements as an index of production movements:  it is indexation based 
directly on a relatively tight technical relationship, there is no cause for complaint.  But much 
indexation in the literature is utterly mindless, based on nothing other than bad precedent, 
unjustified and unjustifiable:  proper measurement requires that we observe our third rule, that 
indexation be thought out. 
 If a series displays a gap, the latter can be filled in (“the series can be interpolated”) in 
a variety of ways.  The simplest index, the know-nothing index, is simply the passing of time:  
the interpolated values are obtained assuming constant growth.23  Even here, however, some 
reflection is in order before proceeding with the calculation.  Most of us quantitative 
historians live in semi-log space, we consider a constant growth rate (x% per year, log-linear 
or “geometric” interpolation) altogether more natural (verisimilar) than constant absolute 
growth (x tons or whatever per year, linear or “arithmetic” interpolation).24  The obvious 
problem, however, is that while linear interpolations are additive, log-linear interpolations are 
not:  the sum of the linear interpolations of a and b is the linear interpolation of (a + b), the 
sum of the log-linear interpolations of a and b is not the log-linear interpolation of (a + b).  
Imagine that from one end of our interpolation to the other a has grown sharply, and b 
declined sharply by just enough to offset that, so that (a + b) does not change at all.  Linearly 
interpolating a and b, or (a + b), or log-linearly interpolating (a + b), we obtain, obviously, a 
flat interpolation, a constant value in each intervening year; if we log-linearly interpolate a 
and b and then aggregate, (a + b) will decline and then recover, displaying a cycle that is 
nowhere in the data and as a rule thoroughly unlikely on its face.25  It may well make more 
sense, in such cases, to reverse the order of the estimates, first log-linearly interpolating (a + 
b), and then obtaining a and b by interpolating their shares of that total.26 
                                                 
23
 The procedure is so standard that this is the default meaning of “interpolation” if no specific 
interpolating variable is explicitly indicated.  
 
24
 If we plot tons (say) against time, constant absolute growth yields a straight line, a constant growth 
rate a curved one; if we plot log(tons) against time, constant absolute growth yields a curved line, 
constant relative growth, a constant growth rate, a straight one (whence “log-linear” if the growth rate 
is held constant). 
 
25
 The published series that display a U-shape between benchmarks signal that they were most 
probably constructed by log-linear interpolation of their components.  The attribution of constant-
growth paths to the individual components may seem reasonable if we look no further, but the implied 
U-shape of the aggregate remains implausible:  if the above scenario were to hold across a series of 
benchmarks, a U-shape would link each successive pair, with the hardly credible implication that each 
and every observation happened to coincide with a local maximum. 
 
26
 Shares are best interpolated linearly, as they then sum to one.  Log-linearly interpolated shares do 
not (and the share obtained for b from the log-linear interpolation of a is not the share of b obtained by 
its own log-linear interpolation; log-linearly interpolating the shares of both a and b and then rescaling 
the results to sum to one seems pointlessly complex).  Conversely, (input-output and other) ratios are 
best interpolated geometrically, as the interpolated values of (a/b) then equal the inverse of the 
interpolated values of (b/a); arithmetic interpolation yields different values, depending on which form 
of the same ratio is actually interpolated. 
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 Again frequently, we interpolate a gap in our series for a by attributing to a the 
movements of a “known” related variable b (“using b as an index of a”).27  Extraordinary 
good fortune aside, however, over the relevant gap the relative changes in a and in b do not 
coincide, and must be reconciled.  The standard (“automatic”) solution is a trend correction, 
i.e., the elimination of the discrepancy by adding a constant to b’s annual percentage changes; 
but that algorithm need not be appropriate.  When b grows much more than a, and its growth 
sharply accelerates, the trend correction may turn the years of relatively slow growth in b into 
years of decline in a; and that decline in a may again make no sense at all, for example if both 
a and b are responding, with different elasticities, to the same impulse (e.g., income growth).  
In such cases, the mere recognition of the problem points to its solution:  not a trend 
correction but an elasticity correction, i.e., the elimination of the discrepancy by a 
multiplicative scaling of b’s annual percentage changes.28  Alternative solutions may yield 
very different profiles; the point here is again that there are alternative solutions, and that the 
choice must be made with due consideration. 
 But the most damagingly mindless indexation occurs across production sequences, 
when entire industries are undocumented, the time path of their product “unknown”; and it 
occurs more often than not, for the surviving evidence is terribly partial.  The standard 
procedure, in such cases, is to calculate the desired aggregate from its known components, up 
from aggregate to higher-level aggregate (using for example cotton and silk alone to represent 
the entire textile sector, and then the textile series, and those for the other thus reconstructed 
sectors, to represent all industry):  so standard a procedure that it is simply followed, without 
discussion or justification (with a single well-known exception, returned to below). 
 Followed also without a thought, clearly, for any thought at all would have killed it 
before it became established.  The procedure’s first step is to attribute to unobserved 
production the path of observed production “of the same sector”:  a double absurdity, le vice 
appuyé sur le bras du crime.  The “sectors” into which we classify the economy may have a 
logic, but they were not designed to support extrapolation across their components:  from the 
present perspective they are simply arbitrary.  Think of the rubber industry, indifferently 
considered a sector in its own right or part of the “chemicals (and related products)” sector, 
and imagine that its product is “unknown.”  With the latter classification rubber is attributed 
the path of the known elements of the “chemicals” group (in Gerschenkron 1962[1955], the 
production of sulphuric acid); with the former, the path of the known elements of industrial 
production in general (there milling, cotton, sulphuric acid, etc., all weighted by their value 
added and again by a coefficient that reflects the coverage of the individual industry groups).  
With the standard procedure the path attributed to rubber, and therefore to industry as a 
whole, is as arbitrary as the selected industrial classification. 
 The attribution of the path of observed production to unobserved production “of the 
same sector” is also nonsense because the components of a given sector may be independent, 
                                                 
27
 There is in such cases the obvious temptation to regress a on b, and to interpolate a using the 
resulting parameters; but these are typically so sensitive to the selected regressors and sample period 
that the resulting estimates are no less arbitrary than those obtained by the direct indexation with 
which we typically make do.  The ultimate criterion, once again, is verisimilitude, the 
“reasonableness” of the result. 
 
28
 In the case at hand, this is geometrically equivalent to forcing the interpolating curve through the 
desired end-point by flattening it, as opposed to rotating it. 
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or even rivals.  Consider for example the textile industries, and imagine, for simplicity, that 
they process only cotton and linen; that neither is covered by output data; and that the 
apparent consumption of raw materials documents the growth of the first (because raw cotton 
is imported), but not of the second (because flax is home-grown).  The growth of the textile 
sector is therefore represented by that of the cotton industry, in effect assuming that the linen 
industry matched its growth.  But we know that the cotton industry was the first to be 
mechanized, that the linen industry was successfully mechanized over a century later:  that 
technological change did not affect the cotton and linen industries together, but long favored 
the first at the expense of the second.  The assumption that linen production grew as cotton 
production did could not be more palpably wrong-headed. 
 Consider too the case of the extractive industries, made up of the mining group and the 
quarrying group.  In many (Continental) countries the subsoil belonged to the Crown:  mining 
was regulated, and documented, as quarrying was not.  In standard practice, the entire 
extractive group is indexed by mining alone, implicitly assuming that quarrying moved 
exactly like mining.  Ask yourself how you would estimate quarrying production in its own 
right, and set yourself to the task:  would you ever assume it moved like the mining sector, 
which operates in an essentially unrelated market?  Would you not infer its movements from 
construction activity, whose materials quarrying provides, working back through the 
production sequence exactly as above (§2.2)?  One wonders why that reasonable procedure is 
not normally applied across sectors as it is within them:  it is as if quantitative economic 
historians were mesmerized by the Statistical Bureaus’ partitioning of the economy into 
different sectors, like deer caught in the headlights of a fast-approaching car, and with equally 
gruesome results. 
 The procedure’s second step is to take the path of the sum of the (partly) documented 
sectors to represent the aggregate, that is, to attribute to the (totally) undocumented sectors, 
together, the path of the (partly) documented sectors, together; and similar considerations 
apply, in spades.  Some industries, typically those processing tropical products, were 
documented as noted by the general statistics on international trade; but direct evidence of 
production was gathered first and foremost where it was of particular interest, and relatively 
easy to obtain.  On both counts, the sources tend generally to document the new factory 
industries far more than the traditional, much smaller-scale and far more dispersed, artisanal 
sectors:  in general, the better-documented sectors were growing at the expense of the less-
documented ones, the assumption that artisanal production grew as factory production did 
could not be, again, more palpably wrong-headed.  There may be practical reasons that 
demand an immediate aggregate estimate, that warrant resort to guesswork rather than 
research; but nothing can justify mindless guesswork, the standard guess that defines the path 
of the undocumented sectors without so much as considering what those were, and how they 
differed from the documented ones.29 
The roots of the standard procedure can only be inferred, as they are essentially 
unspoken; and three possibilities come immediately to mind.  The first is the natural desire to 
produce an aggregate that includes only historical “data,” to the exclusion of estimates, 
                                                 
29
 Contrast Fenoaltea (1972), p. 349:  because documented manufacturing seemed essentially to cover 
new/factory industry and in particular the cyclical investment-goods sector, undocumented 
manufacturing was identified with the artisanal production of consumer goods, and attributed a simple 
slowly-growing (demographic) trend. 
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“guesses”; but that line of thought leads nowhere.  One reason, familiar to those happy few 
who have actually approached the historical sources as historians, vetting them before 
copying “the data,” is that the reported figures are not infrequently themselves guesses, the 
best guesses of the experts, or appointed officials, of the day.  At times, as recalled above, the 
frequency of data publication exceeded the frequency of observation, and the best guess for 
“this year” was “same as the last time we looked, x years ago”:  in such cases the “data” are 
not only guesses, but not even guesses as good as those we can make, as we know what was 
discovered with the next actual observation.  The other, overarching reason, which should be 
immediately obvious even to non-specialists, is that any aggregate series based on a partial set 
of (“observed”) component series implicitly incorporates the very definite guess that the 
excluded (“not observed”) series, together, moved exactly like included ones, again together.  
The surviving “data” are very partial, the only way to avoid including guesswork in the 
aggregate is not to produce the aggregate at all.30 
 This brings us to the second possibility:  that the extrapolation from the documented 
subset to the aggregate is recognized as a guess, but considered a good guess, the legitimate 
attribution to the population of the time path of the sample.  The problem here is that the 
sample is “random” only in a colloquial sense, when I started I had no idea what I would find, 
what I did find was what the sources happened (“randomly”) to throw up.31  A statistically 
random sample is made of sterner stuff, it must be designed to be representative of the 
underlying population; and the historical sources of production data were designed with other 
ends in view, they reflect the specific (and typically fiscal) concerns of the governments of the 
day.  Statistical representativeness was neither here nor there, traditional artisanal industries in 
particular were of little interest and correspondingly “undersampled”:  to attribute to the 
aggregate the path of the documented subset is not only to guess but to guess, as a rule, 
demonstrably badly. 
 And that leads us to the third (and only documented) possibility, Sir Charles 
Feinstein’s claim that there is nothing else one can do, that necessity is here the mother of the 
lack of invention (Feinstein 1972, p. 207).  The central point here is that Feinstein was simply 
wrong, where direct evidence is lacking there is typically much indirect evidence that can be 
exploited, if only one recognizes it for what it is.  The proper method is time-consuming, but 
ultimately simple, in fact simplex.  Invent the series you seek to construct, your initial best 
guess; but don’t stop there, the starting point matters little only if you move beyond it.  Draw 
out the implications of your series as an applied economist would, recognizing technical 
relationships, the impact of trade, the substitution effects that can be inferred from the 
typically abundant evidence on relative prices, the income effects, where appropriate, that 
influence consumption; and set those implications next to the corpus of surviving “data,” to 
                                                 
30
 As just noted, Fenoaltea (1972) treated the index constructed in Fenoaltea (1967) as an index of 
documented production alone.  The earlier work did not address that issue:  my concern there was 
rather to show that the growth rates obtained from aggregate indices were very sensitive to the way 
one weighted the component series, implicitly undercutting the argument in Gerschenkron (1955, pp. 
365–366) from the growth rate generated by his own index. 
 
31
 With the same logic one would attribute to the entire population the mean documented income, the 
income of the few rich enough to pay income tax and thus leave a record of their income.  As far as I 
know nobody has ever done that, the procedure is obviously absurd; why its absurdity seems not to be 
obvious in the present context I cannot begin to explain. 
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the extent that you can master it, as an historian would.  You will soon enough find that your 
initial estimates violate constraints that may be distant but are constraints all the same.  
Revise, rinse, and repeat; at the end of the process you will have a production series, for the 
“undocumented” industry at hand, that is reasonably tightly constrained by economic logic, 
and by the historical evidence.  No more can be asked of it. 
 The bottom line is that all “undocumented” production too must be estimated, with 
suitable disaggregation, explicitly and in its own right – which should be enough to wean you 
from the standard “indexing” procedure, which no one can possibly follow en connaissance 
de cause – and above all with due research and reflection, identifying and exploiting the 
available indirect evidence.  And once all not-directly-documented production too is properly 
estimated in its own right, the classification of economic activities becomes harmless:  the 
estimate of rubber production is then what it is, whether we count rubber as a separate group 
or part of the chemical group affects only our groupings; the higher-level aggregates, like the 
elementary disaggregated estimates, are quite unaffected. 
 Indexation, the inference from the known to the unknown, must be thought out:  we 
must think before we index, we must think while we index, we must think again, for good 
measure, after we index.  It’s a sad comment on the state of our (“intellectual”) profession 
that we should have to be reminded to think. 
 
2.4  Rule 4:  Deflate all current-price values with the same deflator! 
 Our historical measures of value are born, inevitably, at current prices; to eliminate the 
distortions due to the changing purchasing power of the monetary unit, we “deflate” them into 
what we call “real” measures.32 
 The fourth rule is that deflation must be general and not activity-specific.  The 
discussion can be technical (Fenoaltea 1976), but the essential point is simple enough.  To 
construct aggregates, to compare their components, we need to reduce these to a common 
metric; in the measurement context at hand the obvious metric is “value added,” that 
corresponds at once to the value of an activity’s product, net of the materials it consumes, and 
to the value of the activity itself, the income accruing to the primary factors of production 
(“land, labor, and capital”).  Three points bear notice.  The first is that “value added” is the 
obvious metric only now that the concept is part of our standard intellectual baggage; we owe 
it to the United States Census Office, who developed it over the late nineteenth century, not 
without difficulty, to meet the perceived need for a net measure unaffected by vertical 
(dis)integration (ibid., p. 111).33  Second, the value-equivalence of the results of activity and 
                                                 
32
 Deflate, because when the problem first presented itself the immediate need was to eliminate the 
distortion of different-year current-price measures caused by inflation.  In general, the “real” measure 
R is obtained as, or equivalent to, the current-price (“nominal”) measure V divided by a price index P, 
R = V/P.   V is unambiguous, our concern here is with the deflator P. 
 
33
 The measure that came more naturally to hand (to the census-takers that measured production, to the 
legislators that taxed it) was simply value, the firms’ sales.  But it was recognized that equal sales 
could correspond to very different levels of activity, as for example if two textile firms sold identical 
quantities of cloth at the same price, but one worked from the raw fiber, the other from purchased 
yarn; and that the aggregate sales of the firms in an industry (and the accompanying “turnover tax”) 
could be radically reduced by vertical integration even though nothing changed on the shop floor, as 
the transfer of yarn from the yarn-producer to the weaver would pass from a sale on the market to a 
transaction internal to the now integrated firm.   
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of the activity itself is in ipsis rebus, given that activities are valued by their results; it is 
complicated by speculation, market power, and taxation, but these have been dealt with 
elsewhere (ibid.), and need not detain us here.  Third, the objection that this equivalence holds 
only in zero-profit long-run equilibrium is based on the standard textbook model of short-run 
equilibrium, which contemplates non-zero profits; but that objection is as worthless as that 
model (ibid.; also Fenoaltea 2001).34   
In any year, at that year’s prices, we happily accept that if the value added of industry 
a is twice that of industry b, industry a produces twice as much, and is twice as big, as 
industry b.  Problems arise in comparing “value added” across years, because the monetary 
unit in which we denominate our measures (e.g., a dollar) has the nasty habit of stretching, or 
more often shrinking, over time.  To obtain a measure free of the attendant distortion we must 
“deflate” our current-price figures into what we call measures “in constant dollars” or more 
directly “in real terms.”  In the present context, as noted, the problem can be expressed as the 
need to deflate current-price value added to calculate “real value added.”  So far so good.  
 What, then, do we want of our “real” measures?  At a minimum, surely, that they not 
generate wrong answers where we know the right one.  Imagine, to illustrate the issue, a 
school’s class photographs.  Imagine that we have (as we do in the present context) an interest 
in relative magnitudes; and reduce it for simplicity to a merely ordinal interest in heights, we 
want to know only who is taller than whom, never mind by how much.  So on the day the 
students come to school in flat shoes, each class arranges itself from tallest to least tall, and 
the photographs are taken.  A further photograph is taken of the entire student body, similarly 
arranged.  Clearly, if in the photograph of their common class Judy is taller than John, in the 
photograph of the entire student body Judy is again taller than John:  how could she not be? 
 The class photographs correspond to our current-price value added measures, that 
establish relative rank in a limited context (the year); the student-body photograph, to our 
“deflated” measures, that we want to illustrate relative rank even across years.35  Return to the 
metaphor:  our problem is that we cannot actually take the student-body photograph, we must 
construct it by photoshopping, and merging, the pictures of the individual classes – which, as 
it happened, arrayed themselves at varying distances from the camera.  So one class 
photograph can be taken as is, as the base; but to reconstruct the student-body photograph all 
the others must be scaled, the individuals extracted and slotted into the appropriate place in 
                                                 
34
 Any economic historian/historian of economic thought can readily see how that model emerged out 
of its British context, where industrial firms owned their machinery.  Any economist should recognize 
that in a world of complete markets firms (can) rent their machinery as they rent their labor, that in the 
short run the stock of (industry-specific) machinery is given not for the firm but for the industry:  with 
competing entrepreneurs the rental rate of machinery (its annual shadow price, if it is owned) varies to 
drive profit to zero even in the short run.  Nor is that all:  it should also be obvious that if an industry is 
the sole consumer of a raw material the possible variations in output may well be broad enough to 
affect the price of the raw material even with a fixed aggregate stock of machinery.  The only 
difference between the (correctly understood) long-run equilibrium and the (misunderstood) short-run 
equilibrium is that in the latter industry supply is constrained by the given stock of equipment.  The 
textbook dictum “the short-run industry supply curve is the horizontal sum of the firms’ short-run 
supply curves” is simply wrong.  We economists are as careless about the basic theory we teach as 
about the “evidence” we use:  “scientists” indeed! 
 
35
 The objective is to render every observation directly comparable to any other, say industry a in a 
given year to itself in a different year, to industry b in the same year, and to industry b in a different 
year. 
 
19 
 
the larger group.  The merging is not easy – it is hard to tell how the tallest student in one 
class compares to the tallest in another – but one thing is clear:  all the individual figures in 
each class picture are to be scaled in the same proportion.  If that simple rule is not respected, 
our reconstructed picture of the student body may show our friend John as taller than his 
class-mate Judy; we already know that is wrong, and if that is how they appear in the student-
body reconstruction the responsible photoshopper is clearly incompetent. 
 The reader unfamiliar with the literature may well be wondering why s/he had to 
suffer through the preceding paragraphs to reach a conclusion obvious to the meanest 
intelligence (a characterization on which I take the Fifth); the reader familiar with the 
literature will have grasped their import.  The rule that deflation must be general and not 
activity-specific is the claim, in the terms of our metaphor, that Judy and John must be scaled 
in the same proportion, and not in different proportions specific to Judy on the one hand and 
John on the other.  It is apparently not obvious to the profession, for the standard “real” 
measure in the literature violates this elementary rule, and deflates the value added of 
different activities with activity-specific deflators.   
  That measure is the Fabricant-Geary “double-deflation” measure (SNA, p. 295), 
calculated from the standard value-added formula using constant (“base year”) prices.  Let vit 
= pitQit – zitRit represent the current-price value added of activity i in year t, where pit and Qit 
are the price and quantity of its output and zit and Rit the price and quantity of its raw 
material(s); the standard measure of “real value added” at the prices of the base year o is vrito 
= pioQit – zioRit.  Three things immediately hit the eye, and the fan.  First, this measure is 
equivalent to the deflation of current-price value added by an activity-specific deflator:  vrito = 
pioQit – zioRit = (pitQit – zitRit)/[(pitQit – zitRit)/(pioQit – zioRit)], where the denominator in square 
brackets is a (current-year-quantity-weighted) index of the (output and input) prices specific 
to industry i; to return to our earlier metaphor, our photoshopper is clearly incompetent, the 
algorithm generates nonsense results.  Second, as every economist should know, current-price 
value added can be indifferently measured as sales net of material costs, or payments to land, 
labor, and capital (above, footnote 34):  vit = pitQit – zitRit = ritKit + witLit, where K represents 
(land and) equipment in physical units, r is the rental value per unit, L is the labor consumed 
also in physical units, and w is the unit wage, all of course per unit time.  If current-price 
value added is indifferently measured in two different ways, deflated (“real”) value added too 
should be indifferently obtained from either one; but if we use quantities and base-year prices 
that will not be the case, in general pioQit – zioRit will not equal rioKit + wioLit.36  Again, the 
measure yields nonsense results:  its inventors and their imitators are attempting economic 
measurement with an inadequate grasp of economics, that the result should be rubbish is 
hardly surprising.  Third, there is nothing in pioQit – zioRit that guarantees a positive outcome, 
measured “real value added” may well be negative – and it will be, if as we go back in time 
the input-output ratio becomes higher and higher, as it does in any industry marked by 
significant materials-saving technical progress (including fuel-saving progress, as for example 
in metallurgy).  The measure’s results are then obviously nonsense (strongly suggesting that 
they are always nonsense, even when not obviously so).  The immediate problem is again bad 
economics:  there is a logic to the price system, relative input and output prices reflect 
productivity, the input-output ratio; combining prices that reflect one technology and 
quantities that reflect another is absurd on the face of it.37 
                                                 
36
 The one deflates current-price value added by an index of output and raw material prices, the other 
by an index of labor and machinery prices (rental rates). 
 
37
 Of these three problems, only the third was widely noted by the profession, because negative 
estimates soon turned up.  Characteristically, the reaction was not to think, starting from first 
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 The root problem seems twofold.  On the one hand, the sheer intellectual sloppiness of 
our standard measures reflects our professional indifference to measurement, our refusal to 
think about it, seriously, as economists; it is yet another manifestation of our casual approach 
to the evidence.  On the other, the particular form of the standard measures points to a lack of 
general education, of adequate literacy.  “Real” measures have been taken to mean measures 
literally in (price-weighted) things, res, with no recognition that the technical meaning of the 
word is metaphorical.  Even a casual acquaintance with the history of economic thought is 
enough to elucidate the matter:  we called our deflated measures “real,” thing-like, in the 
context of inflation, when things are “real” not because they are things but because they keep 
their value in exchange, and the currency does not.  Imagine a world with a stable price level, 
with substantially unchanged relative prices, save that one good loses its value (because of 
exceptional technical progress, or mass conversion to a religion with dietary restrictions); in 
that world money is “real,” and all goods are “real” except that one.  The antonym of literal 
“real” is “unreal,” the antonym of metaphorical “real” is “nominal”:  a clear enough signal, 
one would think, save for the verbally challenged, the “scientific” economists and economic 
historians, American and Americanized, who never learned how language works because they 
never struggled, in their formative years, with Latin and Greek.  In this literature the only 
exceptions known to me, economists who saw through the res metaphor and advocated 
general rather than activity-specific deflation, are two Italians born early enough, and well 
enough, to have reaped as a matter of course the benefits of a classical education (Fenoaltea 
1976, Fuà 1993); methinks it is not a coincidence.38 
 The bottom line is that to measure all production by the same unchanging standard 
what we actually want to calculate is not “real” value added but “real value” added:  we want 
to deflate all current-price values by the same deflator, the price of “the” good that maintains 
its “real value.”   Here, sadly, the argument peters out without reaching closure, for no such 
good stands out.  Setting aside extravagant suggestions (Fenoaltea 2010), the leading 
candidates are the early favorite, an hour of common labor (as “[the] value [of a nominal sum] 
is precisely equal to the quantity of labor which it can … purchase or command”), or the 
current standard, a broad basket of goods; but the first neglects the rising value of labor itself 
                                                                                                                                                        
principles, but to look for band-aids.  Paul David (1962), in particular, proposed deflating value added 
by the output price alone:  guaranteeing non-negative results, but maintaining activity-specific 
deflation, and violating the first condition that we want a value added measure to meet, that the 
aggregate be insensitive to vertical (dis)integration.  Current-price value added in turning cotton fiber 
into cloth is the same whether we consider it one activity from end to end, or two activities, one 
producing yarn from fiber, the other cloth from yarn; David’s index produces different results if all 
value added from fiber to cloth is deflated by the cloth price, or if the cloth price is used to deflate only 
the value added from yarn to cloth, and the price of yarn is used to deflate the value added in working 
fiber into yarn. 
 
38
 Two comments may be added here.  The first, to engage in counterfactual intellectual history, is that 
the profession’s “real” measures might have followed a very different path had that poisoned metaphor 
been kept at bay, and the problem verbalized only as that of “deflating” current values into a time-
invariant unit.  The other is that the profession’s lack of adequate verbal skills is confirmed by its 
failure to see through Fogel’s attention-seeking word games, first on the “importance” of the railways 
(above, §1.1, footnote 4), and then again on the “efficiency” of slavery (Fenoaltea 1981), not to 
mention in the present context the Sims-Arrow claim that “real value added” does not even exist 
unless the production function is so separable that the primary factors of production alone combine to 
produce such a “thing,” a thing that then interacts with the raw materials to produce the final product 
(Sims 1969, Arrow 1974). 
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as productivity increases, the second neglects the declining value of goods as they become 
more abundant.39  Both seem to be limits to, rather than examples of, an intuitively appealing 
measure:  our “real” measures appear to be defined, at best, up to the growth of the “real 
wage.” 
 This ambiguity of our “real” measures is so to speak in ipsis rebus, there is no getting 
around it; and that is why our fourth rule goes no further than it does.  A compelling standard 
of “real value” cannot be identified or prescribed; but whatever we select as our make-do 
standard it is clear that it must be used across the board, that deflation must be general and not 
activity-specific.40 
 
2.5  Rule 5:  Measure what you want to measure! 
 The above four rules all concern how product should be measured.  A fifth rule 
concerns what we should measure, and it is on ne peut plus Lapalissien:  we should measure 
what we want to measure.  It follows, in the case at hand, that as we are interested in the 
economy’s aggregate product, that is what we should measure.   
 Our standard measure of the economy’s aggregate product is what we call “gross 
domestic product,” familiarly, GDP.  Long ago, when teaching Economics 1 in the United 
States, I would end my presentation of the national income accounts with the question, “why 
does the U.S. have the world’s highest per-capita product?” (as it then was).  The students 
answered with obvious references to advanced technology, abundant resources, “capitalist” 
efficiency (no comsymps there).  Those reasons, I would answer, were true but superficial:  “the 
real reason,” I would say, “is that the measure was invented here.”  The point, of course, was 
that measured product was not a fact, something we observed, but a construct, one of many 
possible constructs. 
 That particular construct was defined by its particular genesis:  who built it, to what 
purpose, and of what materials.  The U.S. national accounts appeared in utero in the 1930s at 
Wesley Clair Mitchell’s National Bureau of Economic Research, an institution marked at once 
by its atheoretical approach, and by its specific interest in cyclical fluctuations (e.g., Lerner 
1947); they emerged as official statistics in the U.S. shortly thereafter, and world-wide, 
essentially on the American model, in the aftermath of the Second World War.41  They came of 
age in a world marked by the Great Depression, when it was widely believed that mature 
capitalism tended inevitably to crisis and mass unemployment, that rearmament and war had 
been only momentary, dreadful remedies, that the next great slump was just around the corner.  
Governments therefore took on the task of stabilizing the business cycle, and maintaining 
employment, with the tools suggested by the General Theory; but to employ them to good 
effect they needed timely evidence on the path of the economy.  The national accounts were to 
                                                 
39
 That decline may be limited, and tied as it were to pigovian diminishing marginal utility, or 
catastrophic, as and if goods increasingly become mere counters in a veblenesque zero-sum status 
game.  The “goods” standard in particular is further burdened by the arbitrariness of any selected 
basket. 
 
40
 It bears notice that if current-price value added is uniformly deflated by a common deflator, the 
much-observed “Gerschenkron effect” simply disappears:  it too reflects not an “index-number 
problem,” but simply bad measurement (Fenoaltea 2019b). 
 
41
 The success of the American model again owed more to hegemony than to technical merit.  Istat’s 
Reddito nazionale had followed the Italian conventions, and excluded intermediate government services 
from aggregate final product; the Fuà team was funded by the Ford Foundation, and Vitali’s estimates 
included them (Fuà 1969), as do our more recent ones. 
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provide that evidence, with minimal delay:  they had to be calculated quickly, even if 
approximately, using statistics that were already available or easily obtained; they were to 
document the current path of the economy, its likely impact on paid employment.  
 The official accounts were shaped by Simon Kuznets, a protégé of Mitchell’s.  In his 
measure Kuznets included all agricultural production, for the market and not, because the 
available data were based on observed acreages and yields.  He included industrial production 
only for the market, and counted its value added, or its value, depending on what data were 
already provided by the Department of Commerce.42  Of the services Kuznets again counted 
those sold on the (legal) market, but also the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing, 
again because the underlying ready-made statistics refer, as in the case of agriculture, to the 
aggregate stock.  Nada mas:  Kuznets gave us an empirical aggregate to solve a practical 
problem, a creature of the Bureau with no theoretical basis at all.  It is not a measure of 
anything, it is at best a rough index of paid-employment-generating production, an even rougher 
index of total product:  and that in the short run, when the ceteris paribus clause may be a 
reasonable approximation.43  It is not a fact, not an observation, but a construct, in fact a muddy 
one, good enough for government work.  And government work it became:  as noted above 
(§1.2) the profession hastily abandoned its pursuit of economic measures and happily took 
them, from then on, as issued by the relevant public Bureau.   
 Kuznets rendered the profession a great service, and a great disservice:  he called his 
construct not “an index of predominantly market-oriented, paid-employment-generating 
economic activity,” as he could and perhaps should have, not even “an index of gross 
domestic product,” which seems the least demanded by intellectual honesty, but, notoriously, 
“gross domestic product” tout court (actually “gross national product,” at the time, but that is 
here irrelevant).  We all know that GDP falls if a man marries his housekeeper, even if there 
is no change in her activities (honi soit qui mal y pense), in her product, and therefore in total 
product, ceteris paribus; we all know, or should know, that “GDP” is not the measure its label 
suggests.  But that has not stopped the profession from taking the label literally:  because we 
do not take measurement seriously, perhaps once again because we are verbally challenged, 
perhaps also because we “social scientists” approach economics as a religion, proscribing 
heresy, accepting the dictates of the clergy, apparently believing that a statistic consecrated as 
                                                 
42
 For most industry, as noted (§2.4), the Department had evolved measures of value added; but the 
Department lacked information on the value of the sub-soil resources the extractive industries consumed, 
and Kuznets simply counted the mining firms’ sales rather than their value added.  The drawing-down of 
(underground) stocks is simply ignored; in strict logic, the mining sector is treated as if the goods it sells 
were created out of thin air rather than extracted (Fenoaltea 2005, pp. 306–307), whence of course the 
sky-high per-capita “product” of oil-producing deserts.  To be precise, in the national accounts the 
mining firms’ “value added” is computed by deducting from sales only the cost of purchased fuel and 
similar ancillary materials.  An analogous “value added” for the transportation industries would deduct 
from the (c.i.f.) delivered value of the goods only the cost of purchased fuel and the like, and include the 
(f.o.b.) value of the goods at the point of origin.  This mixing of value added and value demonstrates that 
the national accounts do not consistently measure production on a value added basis to avoid duplication 
(and sensitivity to vertical integration), as we tell our students:  the underlying motivation was not 
theoretical but practical. 
 
43
 The services of owner-occupied housing generate product but not paid employment; make-work 
projects, digging holes and refilling them, generate paid employment but no product; and so on, about 
which more below.  A specialized index of paid employment and a specialized index of production are 
different tools; Kuznets’ all-purpose Swiss army knife does everything, badly. 
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a measure of gross domestic product is transubstantiated into exactly that (Fenoaltea 2019a).44  
Whatever the reason, the result is clear enough:  we accept “GDP” not for what it is but for 
what it says it is, an economist is one who uses a government-issue screwdriver to hammer 
nails because it says HAMMER right on the handle.45 
 We economic historians, in particular, have no interest in a rough-and-ready policy-
guiding index of the economy’s current path, in “GDP.”   We want to gauge the evolution of 
economies over decades and more, we want to compare them to each other as well as to 
themselves earlier or later; and to do that we need a proper measure of the economy’s product, 
a measure of the opportunity set, in goods-space, it made available to those then alive (over 
their expected lives, at that, and not in any one year, think of the later fourteenth century).  A 
number of considerations come immediately to mind.  Market exchange and paid employment 
are, as such, simply irrelevant (Pollak 1985):  our measure must count unpaid “family 
production” (typically the work of women, there is more than one battle to be fought here), 
the unpaid services of durables, including both consumer durables (not just owner-occupied 
housing but also, e.g., the appliances that allowed housewives to work also outside the home, 
Gordon 2016) and common-use infrastructure (the piazzas their Italian “owner-occupiers” 
enjoy daily, and Americans cross an ocean to see, which is of course where I came in), and 
obviously leisure (corrected for morbidity); and it must count the all-important gifts of nature, 
that vary from time to time and place to place.  By the same token, our measure must exclude 
not just product-less make-work projects but “social intermediates” (armaments, by extension 
the police and the judiciary, perhaps the legal professions), and allow for negative externalities:  
production externalities (environmental costs, including if we want to count it here the reduction 
of our subsoil assets), and consumption externalities too, those caused both by congestion (the 
crush of tourists that has rendered our favorite piazzas quite unlivable) and by social rivalry 
(which turns increasing consumption into a zero-sum game, Veblen 1899, and may well destroy 
much of what we call “modern economic growth”).46  
                                                 
44
 So entrenched has “GDP” become as our measure of “the economy” that even the few economists who 
pursued a better measure of total product felt they had to give it a different name (e.g., Nordhaus and 
Tobin 1972). 
 
45
 It bears notice that the bureaucrats and the profession have parted company:  where we take “GDP” at 
face value, at least in our empirical work, the United Nations emphasizes that what it (nonetheless) calls 
Gross Domestic Product is not that at all, that its “production boundary” is not all-inclusive (SNA, pp. 6–
7).  But they do not concede that the measure is what it is because Kuznets constructed it out of whatever 
statistics were readily available; their disingenuous claim is that it is a purpose-built measure of the part 
of the economy that is of interest to policy-makers, designed as it is to avoid “being swamped” by other 
values.  They claim that it rightly “includes all production of goods for own use …, as the decision 
whether goods are to be sold or retained for own use can be made even after they have been produced, 
[and] excludes all production of services for own final consumption within households … because the 
decision to consume them within the household is made even before the service is provided” – as if a 
subsistence cultivator did not decide to consume the harvest before s/he planted it, or I could not 
charge my neighbor for cooking his steak on my barbecue.  The further argument that traditional 
women’s work must be excluded to maintain consistency with their own definition of “the labor 
force,” which fails to recognize it, is magnificently solipsistic. 
 
46
 This paragraph could easily be expanded into a book, but a few points bear immediate notice.  One is 
that the flow account must be complemented by a stock account, with the former incorporating the per-
period changes in the latter; the current product includes investment, by firms and households (as the 
present value of future services), and excludes disinvestment (the drawing down of stocks due to 
obsolescence, catastrophe, depletion, and depreciation:  our fixation with gross rather than net product 
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 Our backcasting of what we call “gross domestic product” is in fact intrinsically 
laughable.  Imagine us in our Valhalla, imagine our conversation with economic historians yet 
unborn, imagine that they ask us what our generation did.  Shall we be allowed to answer “We 
reconstructed the historical national accounts” (“Oh, wow!”)?  Or will Valhalla admit only the 
unvarnished truth?  “We reconstructed the short-term indices of paid-employment-generating-
production that would have helped past governments implement their stabilization policies, had 
they had our statistics and had they had such policies” (“You did what???”).   
 The bottom line is that if we are interested in economic growth we should not 
construct that index of predominantly market-oriented, paid-employment-generating 
economic activity we have misnamed “gross domestic product,” but measure instead the 
relevant aggregate, correcting “GDP” to include for example leisure, unpaid “family 
production,” and the services of public and private durables other than houses, to exclude for 
example such “social intermediate goods” as the military, and to allow for the externalities of 
both production and consumption.  A challenging agenda, to be sure, but no more so than the 
very different one that gave Kuznets his place in our intellectual history. 
 
 
 
3.  THE EXTANT HISTORICAL NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 
 
3.1  Genesis 
 The above rules are not all on the same level.  The first three – vet the data, 
disaggregate, think when you index – inform the construction of our elementary production 
series, typically in their natural physical units (“tons”):  in the language of simple realism, 
they (aim to) recover the facts that could have been observed, the production that could have 
been measured, at the time.  The series so obtained are constructs we carefully derive from the 
evidence in the sources; they are “elementary” only metonymically, as (our substitute for) the 
production “data” ideal sources would have handed down to us ready-made, and again 
computationally, as the activity-specific reconstructions that then enter the higher-level 
estimates.  These three rules are addressed to the economic historian as historian, their aim is 
to ensure the quality, the historical verisimilitude, of the materials with which we erect our 
structures. 
 The fourth rule concerns the construction of “real value added” estimates 
meaningfully comparable across activities and time periods, and enjoins the deflation of 
current-price value added by a common deflator; the fifth concerns the construction of our 
final measure of aggregate product, and enjoins the adoption of a measure without the 
manifest deficiencies of what we continue to call “GDP.”  Both rules are addressed to the 
economic historian as economist, they are as relevant to the measurement of the present as to 
                                                                                                                                                        
may reflect the original concern with paid employment, or a deeper concern that the available 
depreciation data reflect tax-accounting rules rather than any underlying reality).  Another is that the 
value of free goods cannot be gauged by their market price, sending us back to Dupuit.  In the presence 
of free goods, it may be noted, our “GDP” figures vary in the wrong direction altogether:  the 
opportunity set of people who must arm themselves against a threat, or heat their houses, is smaller than 
that of those who have no need to, ceteris paribus, but their “GDP” is greater.  Our measure should 
grow, and not decline, as we approach Eden, or Marx’s communism.  A third is that veblenesque 
consumption externalities (footnote 39) may well validate the essential message of Easterlin (1974), 
despite the ambiguity of the evidence the author adduces (self-rated “happiness,” again interpreted with 
no sense of what words actually do). 
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that of the past:  their aim is to ensure that we use our materials to erect a satisfactory 
structure, a structure suited to the purpose at hand. 
 Together, these rules suggest a natural taxonomy, a sequence of generations.  The 
historical national accounts produced by the pioneers, “first-generation” estimates in the 
obvious chronological sense, ignored all five rules:  they are usefully considered “first-
generation” estimates in the here relevant methodological sense as well.47  The “second-
generation” estimates take the first step on the road to a more verisimilar reconstruction of the 
past:  they focus on the elementary “data,” they observe the first three rules but, for the 
moment, only these.  These estimates are a corpus of disaggregated production series covering 
the entire economy (at least as defined by the standard GDP “production boundary”):  if we 
distinguish n elementary activities over t years, the second-generation effort yields n 
elementary physical-product series and N = n × t elementary year-specific estimates of 
physical product.  “Third-generation” estimates also observe the fourth rule, that of applying a 
common deflator to the full set of current-price value added estimates; and the latter set is 
generated from the N second-generation estimates of physical product with the aid of a second 
set of N estimates, the (t) year- and (n) activity-specific estimates of current-price value added 
per unit of product.  With the “fourth-generation” estimates, finally, we would move beyond 
conventional “GDP” and actually measure the economy’s aggregate product:  a 
consummation devoutly to be wished. 
 These generations succeed each other slowly, for some are as long-lived as the 
patriarchs.  The supersession of the Kuznets-style index of paid-employment-generating 
production by a proper measure of the economy’s aggregate product, the fourth-generation 
step for us historians, takes the prize:  urgently required by both economists and policy-
makers, after seventy-odd years it is still in the murky, indefinite future.  The third generation 
should in contrast be brief enough, say a matter of a few years, as the necessary year- and 
product-specific estimates of current-price value added per physical unit do not seem to 
present particular difficulties; but the second generation is also dreadfully long-lasting. 
 The evidence here comes from the estimates for Italy from Unification (1861) to the 
Great War, in particular from my own reconstruction of industrial production over that half-
century (Fenoaltea 2015b–h, 2019c).  It takes time to identify the production data, time to 
acquire the technical and institutional knowledge needed to vet it, and time finally to 
transform it into the desired time series:  time, but not an inordinate amount of time.  But 
where production data are not available, where the surviving evidence is indirect and not 
immediately apparent, where the estimates themselves converge to their final form only 
through repeated iterations, months stretch into years, and years into decades.48 
                                                 
47
 In point of fact, my regole emerged from the first-generation corpus I had before me, from the 
evidence of what was, to my eyes, inappropriate procedure (e.g., Fenoaltea 1969, 1982).  I 
concentrated of course on the Italian estimates, estimates constructed using the then-unchallenged 
international standard methodology, estimates criticized because they used it and not because they 
failed to:  the claim that “the ‘Istat-Vitali series’ … were considered not up to international standards” 
utterly misrepresents the literature. 
 
48
 The estimates for the construction industry, for example, took three years of full-time research.  One 
year yielded the initial set of estimates, for railway construction (from mileage data), for other 
infrastructure (from the public-works budgets), and for private buildings (from buildings-tax data); but 
(much like Istat’s) my estimated aggregate value added in 1911 fell far short of that implied by that 
year’s census.  Searching for what I (and Istat before me) may have missed, I discovered that many 
public works appeared in other budgets (e.g., schools, in the education budget); a second year through 
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 Because the second-generation effort is so time-consuming, and after half a century 
still incomplete, we cannot move quickly from the first generation to the third, to our proper 
reconstruction at least of past GDP; in the interim, to satisfy our curiosity, we periodically 
take stock, simply combining what we have into a preliminary set of second-generation 
national accounts, accounts that are in fact preliminary for a double set of reasons.  On the one 
hand, obviously, the aggregate estimates are preliminary because they combine the second-
generation series compiled for only a subset of activities, and crude indices for the rest; as the 
work progresses and such indices are replaced by proper sets of elementary series, these 
second-generation national accounts are periodically revised (e.g., Fenoaltea 2005, 2017b).  
On the other hand, the second-generation aggregates are preliminary because the elementary 
physical product series are combined very simply, with no more than base-year estimates of 
value added per physical unit:  merely n such estimates, rather that the N required for the third 
generation.49  In this second sense the second-generation aggregates remain preliminary even 
if calculated from a full set of proper elementary physical-product series, preliminary because 
they incorporate de facto activity-specific rather than general deflation, preliminary in short 
because fail to respect our fourth rule. 
 The second-generation national accounts, sneak previews justified only by their 
reduced information needs, fail to recognize changes in relative prices; and that means that 
they let us see the economy’s past performance only in a distorting mirror, as illustrated by 
the John-and-Judy show described above.  But we know how relative prices change, mainly in 
response to differences in productivity growth, and approximate measures of such differences 
are readily obtained:  we know in general how our mirror distorts, our second-generation 
aggregates are naturally accompanied by corrected series, not yet third-generation estimates 
but at least controlled conjectures as to their likely shape.50  After half a century of work, the 
Italian literature can offer no more than that:  for the second-generation, only interim 
estimates, for the third, no more than conjectures. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the sources produced estimates that gave for 1911 a total that was higher than before, but still not high 
enough to match the census.  The still-missing component turned out to be privately financed non-
railway infrastructure (e.g., the hydroelectric dams built by the power utilities); and this was recovered 
with a third year of work.  The time absorbed by other major sectors is not so readily established, as 
they were studied, set aside, and then returned to; but such complex and largely ill-documented sectors 
as textiles or engineering each easily absorbed, over time, half a dozen full-time-equivalent years.  
Gerschenkron (1962 [1955]), his first-generation index of Italian industrial production, incorporated a 
few dozen series mostly found ready-made in the Annuario; it should not have taken more than a few 
months. 
 
49
 The second-generation elementary “real value added” series are base-year-value added-weighted 
physical product series, in the above notation vrito = (vio/Qio) Qit.  Expanding this last, vrito = (vio/Qio) Qit 
= (pitQit – zitRit)/[(pitQit – zitRit)/((pio – zio(Rio/Qio )) Qit)]:  the implicit value-added deflator, in square 
brackets, is obviously activity-specific.  The calculated “real” value-added relatives are therefore 
distorted – like the first-generation “double-deflated” relatives, albeit typically less so (Fenoaltea 
1976).   
 
50
 E.g., Fenoaltea (2011b).  The second-generation aggregate is there accepted, but its composition is 
tentatively recalculated to allow for plausible trends in relative prices, yielding conjectural time series 
for the economy’s major sectors not at 1911 prices, but at the 1911 price level.   
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3.2  Corpus delicti 
 The pioneering historical national accounts, for the major European economies, were a 
mere handful, easily reviewed (Fenoaltea 1982).  Since then, the corpus of historical national 
accounts has exploded – the Maddison project website provides no fewer than twenty-three 
such national sets, along with Angus Maddison’s own famous world-spanning reconstruction 
– and I cannot claim to have mastered it.51  But as far as I have been able to tell, all are 
absolutely standard replicas of the pioneers’ work, the methodology appears not only 
unchanged but unquestioned.52  Those accounts appear to have been done quickly, ignoring 
the above time-consuming rules, and when done, done, as would have satisfied Macbeth.53  
Above all, they appear to have been produced serenely, with none of Macbeth’s own 
anguished soul-searching:  produced with the confidence and untroubled conscience bestowed 
by an unquestioning faith in orthodoxy, the orthodoxy maintained by institutional design, by 
the system of heresy-rejecting peer review that Galileo also encountered.54  
  This mass failure to follow le regole dell’arte scandalizes me, because my professional 
ethics are those of an old Italian craftsman; but quality standards can arguably be excessive, 
Italy’s seventeenth-century industrial decline has in fact been attributed precisely to attitudes 
like mine (Cipolla 1959, Rapp 1975, but see also Fenoaltea 1999).  My readers, I suspect, are 
cut from a different cloth:  pragmatic, Missouri-born, with no thought of rending their clothes, 
they are waiting to be shown that the first-generation corpus is not good enough in practice, 
that the later generations are worth the effort and the time. 
The case has in part already been made.  For one, as recalled above, inadequate 
disaggregation means that the first-generation estimates cannot help us distinguish between 
alternative interpretations (“hypotheses”) consistent with the same aggregate.  Again, the 
failure to adopt a common deflator means that the first-generation “real” estimates cannot 
capture the economy’s evolving structure:  such estimates reveal nothing under the 
aggregate’s surface, they are practically exoskeletal. 
 The remaining question is whether the first-generation estimates adequately represent 
at least the shape of that aggregate, the minimal aggregate, conventional GDP.  In principle 
nothing can be said, it is a straightforward matter of luck; and even in practice very little can 
be said, as the only evidence to hand is that provided by the Italian case.  That evidence is 
here summarized by Figure 1, which plots together the annual per-capita product attributed to 
                                                 
51
 The national accounts are collected at https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/na/, 
Maddison’s figures at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm (accessed December 2019).  I will 
not repeat, yet again, my reasons for questioning both Maddison’s competence, and his intellectual 
honesty; see most recently Fenoaltea (2019a, footnote 49). 
 
52
 In the international corpus the only exception I have found is the Egyptian reconstruction by Ulaş 
Karakoç, who describes it as “first-generation” work in the above taxonomy (Karakoç 2017, p. 61); 
the others appear to produce first-generation work sans le savoir. 
 
53
 Some efforts mobilized a large team and absorbed man-decades rather than mere man-years; but 
experience is not additive, a number of cooperating apprentices can no more substitute for a single 
master than nine cooperating women can deliver a baby in one month. 
 
54
 Only a religious commitment to orthodoxy can account for the collection not just of rejections, but 
of spluttering, indignant rejections, I have collected over the years.   
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post-Unification Italy by the first-generation Istat-Vitali estimates (Fuà 1969), by their 
amended version from Maddison (1991), by the preliminary second-generation estimates 
(Fenoaltea 2005), by the sesquicentennial estimates (Baffigi 2011), and by my own recent, 
revised second-generation estimates (Fenoaltea 2017b).55 
 Ugliness too is in the eye of the beholder, and I have a dog in this fight; but it is a fair 
statement that even the earliest second-generation estimates prompted the profession to look 
for stories very different from those suggested by the estimates of the first generation 
(Fenoaltea 2011, ch. 1, and 2017a), the estimates produced with the international standard 
methodology.  The first Italian estimates are as good, or as bad, as (the bulk, at least, of) those 
now available for other countries:  the to my mind inescapable conclusion is that the extant 
corpus of historical national accounts is to say the least unreliable. 
 The broad corpus of historical national accounts is very much first-generation stuff, of 
unknown, but certainly suspect, fidelity to (what we can know of) the facts.  Economists, and 
the cliometricians they train, hold measurement in contempt, and happily exploit these 
comptes fantastiques – the more fantastiques, in fact, the further back they go – in studies that 
span the ages and the continents.  These reconstructions, and the analyses that famously 
exploit them, are neither science nor history; we can appreciate them, perhaps, as literature. 
 
 
  
                                                 
55
 Baffigi’s estimates (2011) are close kin to my earlier ones (2005); my latest (2017) differ primarily 
because they allow for harvest fluctuations (increasing short-term variability), and, more significantly, 
because they remove hitherto unnoticed gross errors in the estimates for the services he and I 
inherited, to a varying degree, from colleagues who worked specifically on that sector.  
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Figure 1 
 
Per-capita income at 1911 prices, 
Italy, 1861-1913:  alternative estimates (lire) 
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APPENDIX A.  RECKONING WITH MAINTENANCE 
 
 
A.1  Industry v. services 
 The quantitative reconstruction of the past is organized by an accounting framework.  
The ISIC (p. 29) treats maintenance with the lack of uniformity, not to say common sense, we 
have come to expect of the United Nations:  the repair of motor vehicles and the repair of 
personal and household goods are considered services (respectively trade, division 45, and 
other services, division 95), the repair of other machinery and the repair of buildings and other 
structures are considered industry (respectively manufacturing, division 33, and construction, 
division 43).   
Logically, surely, maintenance is either the one thing or the other.  As to which it is, a 
repairman surely provides a maintenance service; and equally surely that is entirely irrelevant, 
for factors of production always provide services, and the relevant criterion is whether or not 
those services yield a commodity, a good that exists in its own right and can be stored and 
resold.56  New production of goods takes commodities with certain physical characteristics 
and transforms them into commodities with more desirable (“valuable”) physical 
characteristics, maintenance takes commodities with certain physical characteristics and 
transforms them into commodities with more desirable (“valuable”) physical characteristics; 
there is no meaningful difference between the two, the only sensible solution is to consider 
maintenance activity uniformly as “industry” rather than “services.” 
 
A.2  Net production/capital formation v. cost of production 
 All this involves only what is counted where; but maintenance involves a more serious 
issue, the issue of whether it should ultimately be counted at all.  The issue turns on whether 
maintenance is considered production (of reconditioned durables), or a cost of production (of 
the goods and services that use those durables).  The United Nations is, on the subject, 
unusually guarded:  the SNA asserts that ordinary maintenance is to be considered a cost of 
production, while more extensive maintenance is to be considered production – but grants the 
possible objection that all maintenance should be considered production.57   
The objection appears valid:  painting a hull yields a painted hull, to consider it 
production of a durable good (and capital formation) in some cases and a cost of production 
(of seaborne transportation) in others seems frankly quixotic.  Maintenance produces a 
commodity (a newly reconditioned good) that wasn’t there before, just as new production 
produces a commodity (a brand-new good) that wasn’t there before; and the former 
                                                 
56
 Services proper cannot be, which is why the providers of transportation or medical services can 
price-discriminate as commodity-producers cannot. 
 
57
 “Ordinary maintenance and repairs undertaken by enterprises to keep fixed assets in good working 
order are treated as intermediate consumption. However, major improvements, additions or extensions 
to fixed assets, both machinery and structures, which improve their performance, increase their 
capacity or prolong their expected working lives count as gross fixed capital formation.  In practice it 
is not easy to draw the line between ordinary repairs and major improvements, although the SNA 
provides certain recommendations for this purpose.  Some analysts, however, consider that the 
distinction between ordinary repairs and maintenance and major improvements and additions is neither 
operational nor defensible and would favour a more ‘gross’ method of recording in which all such 
activities are treated as gross fixed capital formation” (SNA, pp. 8–9). 
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commodity is clearly a durable good, just as the latter is.  Logically, maintenance is industrial 
production, and capital formation; secundum non datur.58 
 
A.3  The “logic” of the United Nations 
 The national accounts were less concerned with production in general than with paid-
employment-generating production in particular; one consequence was the neglect of 
household production (and the attendant consumption), essentially traditional “women’s 
work,” the women’s work that is never done.  A further consequence was the neglect of 
households’ consumption of the services of the durables they owned (save housing), and, 
derivatively, of the corresponding stock of durables.  The accounting framework does not 
allow households to invest in durable goods (save housing, as will not be repeated):  
everything households purchase is treated as a non-durable, households are assumed to 
consume not the transportation services of their vehicles but the vehicles themselves, to eat 
not just the food in the refrigerator but the refrigerator too. 
 Choices are path-dependent.  In the national accounts firms are recognized as owners 
of durable goods, their additions to their stocks are recognized as investment; the maintenance 
of their assets could be considered industry, as seemed sensible (there is not much difference 
between the shops in which locomotives are assembled, and those in which they are 
disassembled and reassembled), and it could as noted be taken to produce either a final good 
or, as the United Nations prefers, an intermediate good consumed in the production of other 
goods and services.   But maintenance could not be taken as an intermediate good in the 
production of the services of household durables:  because these durables were altogether 
ignored, there was no imputed value-of-product from which this input could be deducted.  But 
the product of firms that maintain household durables had to be counted somewhere; and the 
“clever” solution was to pretend that those firms’ activity did not yield (altered) commodities, 
that those firms were not “industry” but “services.”  And that is where, in the production 
accounts, they are supposedly to be counted:  a blacksmith repairing a farmer’s plow works in 
industry, but the moment he turns to repairing a household’s andirons he migrates to a 
different sector, only to return when that job is done.  I kid you not. 
  
                                                 
58
 Logically, too, the “durability” of a good depends not on a convention related to how long it lasts 
(“one year”), but on the facts of the case:  whether use implies the (destructive) consumption of the 
good itself (food, a raw material, an hour of labor), which disappears, or the consumption (only) of the 
services of the good, which survives (a refrigerator, a tool, a laborer).  From this perspective the 
exclusion of clothes-washing from durable-good-producing industry is arguably not an exception, as 
while the textile products themselves are clearly durables, their spotlessness and odorlessness are not:  
the national income and product accounts are a hair-splitter’s playground. 
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